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REASONABLENESS IN THE LAW
AND SECOND-PERSONAL ADDRESS
Gideon Yaffe*
I. INTRODUCTION
Law students discover very early in their legal educations that
the "reasonable person" is a ubiquitous fixture of the law. Whether
or not an injury is the product of negligence in tort law depends on
whether or not a reasonable person would have taken a precaution
which would have averted the injury.' Whether or not an offer has
been made in contract law depends on whether or not a reasonable
person would have taken the party to be conferring a power to create
an agreement through acceptance.2 Whether or not an act of killing
an aggressor was done in self-defense in criminal law depends on
whether or not a reasonable person would have taken deadly force to
be required to repel the threat.3 The list goes on and on. Over and
over again the law asks not just what the plaintiff or defendant
actually did or thought, but also what a reasonable person would
have done or thought, or what a reasonable person would have
understood another person to have done or thought. Defendant's
actions and thoughts are compared, that is, to those of the reasonable
person. In fact, sometimes what the defendant actually did or
thought is irrelevant; all that matters is what the reasonable person
would have done or thought. Such is the case, for instance, in the
mens rea of negligence in criminal law. If, for example, a reasonable
person would have expected a particular act to kill another human
being, then one of the mens rea elements of negligent homicide is
* Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law, University of Southern California. B.A.,
Harvard University; Ph.D., Stanford University. I would like to thank Michael Bratman, Stephen
Darwall, Robin Kar, and Gary Watson for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of
this article.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282,283 (1965).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2 cmt. b (1981).
3. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962).
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present even if the defendant did not expect that result, or even if the
defendant expected the opposite.' Our law gives tremendous weight
to the acts and thoughts of the reasonable person.
Yet despite its ubiquity in the law, not enough thought has been
given to the question of what the reasonable person is doing there.
Plenty of writing has been done on the question of what constitutes
reasonableness in particular domains.' Think, for instance, of the
volumes of work on the Hand Formula as a means of assessing
reasonable care in negligence torts.6 What has not been sufficiently
discussed, however, is the following macro-level question: is there
any justification for the use of reasonable person standards in the
law? To put the question another way, under what conditions is it
justified for a judge to employ a reasonable person standard or for a
legislator to write one into the law? While it is possible that the
answer will be "never," it is more likely that we can identify a
legitimate role for the reasonable person standard. We will then be
able to determine if the law's reliance upon such a standard in a
particular area is or is not justified by determining whether or not the
reasonable person is playing its justifiable role in that domain.
Further, with the identification of a legitimate role for the reasonable
person standard could come criteria for determining what does and
does not legitimately count as reasonable in a particular domain of
the law. When we have an idea of what the reasonable person is
doing in the law, we should be able to determine what is and is not
reasonable by determining whether or not those classifications serve
the legitimate ends for which reasonable persons were appealed to in
the first place.
4. Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
5. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REv. 813 (2001); Saba Ashraf, Note,
The Reasonableness of the "'Reasonable Woman" Standard: An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 483 (1992); Carrie L. Hoon, The Reasonable Girl: A New Reasonableness Standard to
Determine Sexual Harassment in Schools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 213 (2001); Melissa K. Hughes,
Note, Through the Looking Glass: Racial Jokes, Social Context, and the Reasonable Person in
Hostile Work Environment Analysis, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1437 (2003).
6. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947); see also R.I.
Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Zapata Corp., 848 F.2d 291, 294-95 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that the
bank met reasonable commercial standards in converting to a "bulk-filing" system where
increased loss was reasonable in light of the costs the new practice would save); cf East River
S.S. Corp. v. Transam. Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 872 (1986) (finding that the increased cost to the
public from holding a manufacturer liable in tort for injury to the product itself is not justified).
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This article considers the fruitfulness of a particular hypothesis
about the legitimate role of reasonableness in the law. Using
Stephen Darwall's recent work on the second-personal standpoint, I
propose a justification for the use of the reasonable person in the
law.7 Unilluminatingly put, that justification is as follows: reason-
able person standards are justifiably employed in the law only if the
law in question is regulating or implementing a very particular sort
of communicative act. Darwall refers to this as an act of "second-
personal address" of a "second-personal reason," a complex notion to
be defined in what follows.8 Metaphorically speaking, such an act is
a transaction between parties in which what is passed from addresser
to addressee is a reason for the addressee to act. It is often the case,
as we will see, that the prospects of success of such an act of
communication can be assessed by determining what a reasonable
person-someone equipped to give or receive reasons through such
an act of communication-would have done or thought. It is also
often the case that making such an assessment is essential if the law
is to accomplish its aim.
Part II explains the elements of Darwall's view that are essential
to understanding what this thesis amounts to and for arguing for it.
Part III explains how those elements supply a justification for the use
of the reasonable person standard in one place in which it plays a
particularly prominent role: in the determination of negligence in tort
law. Finally, Part IV uses the elements of Darwall's view to explain
the role of the reasonable person in criminal law, namely in the
element of force in rape. There we see how an appeal to the
reasonable person can be unjustified precisely because it fails to play
the role that such standards can legitimately play. Once we see the
legitimate work that the reasonable person can do in the law, we also
see how it can be used illegitimately.
I do not mean to suggest that every justified usage of the term
"reasonable" in the law is justified for the reasons proposed here.
The term is used too widely and in too many areas of the law to
expect any theory of its proper function to explain all of its varied
legitimate usages. Nor do I mean to suggest that the only way to
7. The most important statement of Darwall's view, and the statement from which my
reconstruction of his position is taken, is STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006).
8. Id. at 8; see also infra Part II (discussing this concept).
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understand the role of reasonableness in the law is through appeal to
the concept of second-personal address. Perhaps this is so, but
nothing to be said here depends on that. Rather, my aim is to show
that the role of reasonableness in the law can be highly illuminated
under the hypothesis that wherever there is a legitimate appeal to
reasonableness in the law, there is an act of second-personal address
being either implemented or regulated.
II. CONCEPTUAL DEFINITIONS
The central thesis that will be driving the discussion here is
Darwall's notion of "the second-personal address" of "second-
personal reasons."9  What does that mean? The notion has two
components-namely "second-personal address" and "second-
personal reasons"-which, as I see it, are to be defined separately? °
A. Second-Personal Address
Second-personal address is a type of communicative act. To
engage in a communicative act is to engage in an act the aim of
which is to communicate information to another person. The notion
of second-personal address can be understood broadly or narrowly;
the narrow sense will be of greater importance here, but it is
important to appreciate the distinction.
In the broad sense, a communicative act is one of second-
personal address where, and only where, the information intended to
be conveyed through the act is expressed, or would be aptly
expressed, using the second-person pronoun "you." If I say to you in
9. See DARWALL, supra note 7, at 8. A disclaimer is in order at just this point: Whether
what I am about to describe is in fact what Darwall understands by the second-personal address of
second-personal reasons is not of much importance for our purposes here. It is possible that
Darwall would not accept all the elements of what I will be ascribing to him in this section. Still,
the notion to be described here is certainly in the neighborhood of Darwall's. Whether or not my
explanation is exactly in line with Darwall's notion, my account of his theorems will play an
important role in the next two sections of this paper.
10. Because Darwall is primarily concerned with the second-personal address of second-
personal reasons, and not with the second-personal address of other kinds of reasons, or with
other kinds of address of second-personal reasons, he sometimes writes as though the two
concepts cannot be independently defined. He sometimes writes, that is, as though the term
"second-personal address" only applies when what is being addressed is a second-personal
reason, and sometimes writes as though it is only through second-personal address that a second-
personal reason can be addressed. Robin Kar, for one, reads him in this way. See Robin Kar,
Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2007). I find it
helpful, and it is harmless, to distinguish the two notions.
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an ordinary circumstance, for example, "There's something stuck in
your teeth," I am engaging in an act of second-personal address in
this broad sense: I use the second-person pronoun to convey the
information that I am aiming to convey. If I were instead to point
significantly at my own teeth without saying a word, I might also be
engaging in an act of second-personal address in the broad sense, for
the information that I am conveying through this act could just as
well have been expressed by my saying "There's something stuck in
your teeth." Similarly, an act of communication is one of first- or
third-personal address where, and only where, the information
intended to be conveyed through the act is expressed, or would be
aptly expressed, using the first- or third-personal pronouns,
respectively.
In this broad sense, there are various nice questions, questions
that will not concern us, about when communicative acts are first-,
second-, or third-personal. When a professional athlete says, for
instance, "Barry has to do what's best for Barry," is he engaged in
first-personal, or third-personal address? He does not use the term
"I," but he is obviously referring to himself and much of the
information that his utterance aims to convey (although not the
information about his degree of self-regard) could have been
conveyed by saying "I need to do what's best for me." Consider
another example, which will be more important for our purposes: if
in B's hearing, and with the intention that B should hear him, A says
to C, "B has something stuck in his teeth," is A engaging in an act of
second-personal or third-personal address? He has not used the
second-person pronoun, and the primary piece of information that he
conveys-that B has something stuck in his teeth-could be
expressed, and in fact was expressed, without it. However, A may
also be aiming to convey the following piece of information: A is
addressing B. That is, A might want B to know that he, A, is
communicating to B the information that there is something stuck in
his teeth. (He has other reasons, one can imagine, for speaking
directly to C rather than to A.)
In fact, we often care to express this sort of information to
others. We are often interested to communicate to others the fact
that we are communicating with them. We want them to know not
just the primary piece of information that we aim to convey; we also
want them to know that we ourselves are conveying it. This suggests
Spring 20071
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a narrower sense of second-personal address: a communicative act is
one of second-personal address in the narrow sense where, and only
where, among the pieces of information the actor intends to
communicate is that he is addressing the person to whom he intends
to communicate the information. One of the things he is saying is, "I
am addressing you."
Second-personal address in this narrow sense has no correlate in
first- and third-personal address. Insofar as we intend to express to
those whom we address the fact that we are addressing them, we are
engaged in second-personal address in this narrow sense. So an act
of first-, third-, or even second-personal address in the broad sense
may or may not be an act of second-personal address in the narrow
sense that concerns us, because the actor may or may not be aiming
to express that he is addressing his addressee.
To see the point, compare the following two examples: (1) A,
seeing that B's glass is empty, asks the bartender to give B, at the
other end of the bar, a drink, but not to identify who bought it; and
(2) A, seeing that B's glass is empty, asks the bartender to give B a
drink and to say, while delivering it, "From the gentlemen at the end
of the bar." In the first case, A just wants B to have another drink
(and perhaps to give B a sense of mystery). In the second, A wants it
known that he is the one who caused the drink to be delivered.
Second-personal address in the narrow sense is analogous to the
second case, except that what is being conveyed is not a drink but
some piece of information, like a piece of information about the state
of B's teeth.
From here on, I will be using the term "second-personal
address" to refer to the narrow sense of second-personal address. It
does not matter for our purposes, or for Darwall's, what pronouns are
or could be used to express the information being communicated.
What matters is that in some but not all acts of communication
between parties, the communicator is intending to communicate the
fact that he is communicating with the person to whom he is
communicating. It is those acts of communication that concern us
and which we will refer to with the term "second personal address."
All acts of second-personal address, then, convey two pieces of
information: a primary piece of information (such as that there is
something stuck in the addressee's teeth) and a secondary piece of
information, namely, that the addressee is being addressed by the
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addresser. It is that second piece of information that makes acts of
second-personal address distinctive; it is what makes it peculiarly
appropriate to engage in them while looking the addressee in the eye.
A point of clarification is in order. In many cases, one party
does, in fact, communicate to the other that he is addressing him
without that piece of information being any part of what the
communicator intends to communicate, in the sense of "intends" that
is relevant here. Such cases are not instances of second-personal
address in the narrow sense. For instance, seeing that a large object
is about to fall on B, A says, "Look out!". A knows perfectly well
that B will recognize not just that he is in danger and needs to act
quickly to avoid injury, but also that A is addressing him and
conveying that information to him. But, in ordinary cases, the
success of A's act of communication does not turn on whether or not
B comes to believe that A was addressing him; that is not part of
what A intends to communicate, even though he knows full well that
he will communicate it. If, for some reason, B gets confused and
takes the warning to have been given by C instead of A, while A may
wish that he was being given the credit for saving B's life, he would
not see his act of communication, as such, as having failed. He
succeeded in communicating the information that he intended to
communicate, namely that B was in danger and needed to act quickly
to avoid it.
Now there are, of course, senses of the term "intend" in which
one who (1) foresees that his act will have a certain result, (2) sees
the occurrence of that result as among the reasons for performing the
act, and (3) performs the act in part for that reason, also intends the
result. Such might be the case here: A might want not just for B's
life to be saved but for B to recognize that he, A, is the savior; and he
might anticipate that if he warns him, B will recognize him as such
since he will recognize A to be the one who is communicating the
life-saving information to him. He might warn B in part for that very
reason. But still, in the sense of "intend" that interests us here, A
does not intend to communicate the fact that he is addressing B, but
merely foresees that the information will be communicated. Suffice
it to say that it would take us too far afield to work out a precise
theory of the notion of intention that supports these claims. As the
Gricean program in the philosophy of language has borne out, it is
very difficult to specify the nature and content of communicative
Spring 2007]
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intentions with the precision necessary to informatively capture what
information is and is not part of what a communicative act is
intended to communicate." For our purposes, an intuitive
understanding of that distinction will suffice for delineating the class
of acts of second-personal address.
B. Second-Personal Reasons
Not all acts of second-personal address are of the special sort
that are of particular concern to Darwall. He is particularly inter-
ested in the second-personal address of second personal reasons.
What does that mean? Here is Darwall's definition of a second-
personal reason: "A second-personal reason is one whose validity
depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations
between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the reason's
being addressed person-to-person."' 2 It is important to pull apart two
entwined ideas here corresponding to two classes of reasons: (1) the
class of reasons for a person to act that depend for their validity upon
authority and accountability relations between people; and (2) the
class of reasons for a person to act that depend for their validity upon
the possibility of their being communicated through an act of second-
personal address.
Consider the first class. Some reasons to act would be valid
even if there were no authority or accountability relations between
people. That I am in pain gives me some (perhaps overridden)
reason to take steps that would lead to the pain's ceasing regardless
of who does or does not have authority over me, who I have
authority over, who I am accountable to, or who is accountable to
me. A father, son, brother, judge, jury member, and professor have
reason to make their pain stop quite independently of their
occupancy of any of these roles.
However, many reasons for action are dependent upon roles of
this sort and the implied relations of accountability and authority that
occupants of these roles stand in with respect to one another. I have
11. See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS chs. 5, 6 (1989). See generally
Richard E. Grandy & Richard Warner, Paul Grice, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Summer 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2006/entries/grice/ (describing Grice's influential distinction between the literal meaning of a
phrase and a speaker's meaning in uttering it, and observing some of the contemporary
controversies about how precisely to draw this distinction).
12. DARWALL, supra note 7, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
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reason to report an act of plagiarism in part because I have authority
over the student who engaged in it, in part because the students in my
courses are accountable to me for the things they do in their capacity
as students, and in part because I am accountable to my university
for the things I do and omit doing in my capacity as a professor. I
would not have the full list of valid reasons to report an act of
plagiarism that I have (although I might still have some) if it were
not for these relations. At least some, then, of my reasons to report
an act of plagiarism depend for their validity upon the existence of
authority and accountability relations among people, and so belong
to the first class of reasons.
It is far from obvious that the validity of reasons of the first sort
depends upon the possibility of their being communicated through an
act of second-personal address; membership in the first class does
not appear to automatically imply membership in the second. It is
not obvious (although it may be true) that my reason to report the act
of plagiarism depends for its validity upon the possibility of anyone
communicating that reason to me through an act of second-personal
address, or of my communicating it to anyone through such an act.
Imagine, for instance, that we have a double-blind grading
system: I do not know who the student is and the student does not
know who is grading his paper. And imagine that we also have a
double-blind procedure for reporting an act of academic dishonesty:
those who receive the report are barred from knowing who reported
it, and the reporter is barred from knowing who he is reporting to. In
such a case, I am not in a position to communicate my reason to
report to anyone while at the same time communicating that I am the
one communicating this. And no one is in a position to communicate
to me my reason to report while at the same time communicating to
me that he is the one communicating this. So while it might be
possible to communicate to me my reason for reporting-the faculty
handbook, we can imagine, communicates this in general terms-it
is not possible to communicate it through an act of second-personal
address, since such an act requires that part of what is intended to be
conveyed is the fact that a particular person is doing the
communicating.13
13. I am assuming here that the university is not the sort of entity that can have authority
over me, and is not the sort of entity capable of communicating with me through an act of second-
personal address. Under these assumptions, the relevant sections of the faculty handbook are not
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Another way to put the point: it seems silly to think that those
who are in a position to communicate to me, through an act of
second-personal address, my reason to report the plagiarism have
anything to do with the reason's validity. When I tell my wife about
the situation, she might tell me that I have reason to report the act of
plagiarism, and she might intend to communicate to me that she is
the one communicating this. But the possibility of that happening
cannot be even part of what makes my reason to report the
plagiarism valid. Whatever authority and accountability relations
hold between my wife and myself are not relevant to the question of
what reasons I have to report an act of plagiarism, since that is surely
between myself and the student, myself and the university, and the
student and the university; unmarried faculty have the same reasons
to report plagiarism as those who are married. Still, it seems I have a
reason to report, and this reason's validity depends upon various
authority and accountability relations among people. So a reason's
being in the first class does not imply that it is in the second.
Notice that in the passage from Darwall just quoted, in which he
gives his definition of a second-personal reason, he seems to think
that membership in the first category does imply membership in the
second. In fact, although this is not generally true, it is true in a
restricted range of cases, and it is likely that Darwall has this
restricted range in mind. Sometimes a person has a valid reason to
act only because he stands in some relation of authority or
accountability to another person and that person exercises his power
to give reasons for action by communicating such reasons through a
successful act of second-personal address.
The obvious cases of this sort are those involving the authority
to give orders. If A has the authority to tell B what to do, then B
gains a reason to do some particular thing when A, by telling B to do
that thing, successfully communicates to B that he has such a reason.
The reason does not precede the communication of it but is, instead,
generated by the act of communication, for that act is itself the
exercise of A's power to generate such a reason. The parent who
plausibly understood as an act of second-personal address of a second-personal reason where the
university is the addresser and I am the addressee. Of course, these assumptions can be
questioned. The question is whether a different example, similarly illustrative of the fact that a
reason could belong in class (1) without belonging in class (2), could be tailored to the position of
someone who denies them. I suspect so, although I have no argument for the claim.
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answers a child's request for a justification for a demanded act by
saying, "Because I told you to do it" is, in some cases, speaking the
simple truth: the child has a reason to act precisely because the
parent addressed him and thereby exercised a power to give the child
such a reason.
Further, in such cases, the reason cannot be generated except
through the performance of an act of second-personal address. What
gives B reason to do what A demands is, in part, that A, who has
authority over him, is demanding it. Hence it is essential to the
generation of the reason that A communicate to B not just the
demand, but also that he, A, is demanding it of B. And further, in
such cases, the reason cannot be generated unless the act of
communication is successful (or could be): if A issues an order that B
cannot understand, B does not yet have a reason to do what A
demanded of him. A must be understood in order for what he is
communicating, namely that B has a reason to do something, to be
true.
There is another class of cases where dependency of the reason's
validity on authority and accountability relations is linked to
dependency of its validity on the possibility of the reason's being
communicated through an act of second-personal address. These are
cases in which something about the situation in which one finds
oneself makes it clear that another person who stands in an authority
relation to oneself, or to whom one is accountable, would exercise
her power to generate a reason for one to act by successfully
communicating the reason through an act of second-personal
address, if she had an opportunity to do so. For instance, to use
Darwall's leading example, say that B is treading on A's foot. 4 A
has the authority to tell B to remove his foot, and would exercise that
authority through an act of second-personal address, thereby
generating a reason for B to remove his foot, if given the chance. In
such a case, B has reason to move his foot, even if A never tells him
to. In cases like this, the validity of B's reason to move his foot
depends on the truth of a counterfactual: if given the chance, A
would demand that B move his foot, thereby (1) exercising his
authority over B in this matter; and (2) successfully communicating
to B both his desire that B should move his foot and the fact that A,
14. Id. at 5-7.
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who has authority in this matter, is communicating this to B. That is,
the reason's validity depends upon the (unrealized) possibility of the
reason being successfully communicated through an act of second-
personal address.
The two kinds of reasons just discussed-those that are
generated by a successful act of second-personal address and those
that are generated by a non-actual hypothetical act of this sort-
constitute an area of overlap between the two categories of reasons
identified above. They are reasons that depend for their validity
upon authority or accountability relations among people and, because
those relations give powers to persons to generate reasons for others
through acts of second-personal address, they depend for their
validity upon the possibility of their communication through such
acts. The term "second-personal reasons" will be used to refer to
reasons in this class.
15
The second-personal address of a second-personal reason, then,
is an act of second-personal address that is itself an exercise of a
power of the addresser to give the addressee the very reason that he
communicates to the addressee. By communicating to the addressee
that he, the addresser, is communicating with the addressee, the
addresser puts the addressee on notice that he is exercising this
power and, thereby, gives validity to the reason he communicates.
So defined, it is arguable that the reason to report the act of
plagiarism is a second-personal reason. On the criteria discussed
above, Darwall appears to think so. Perhaps I have a valid reason to
report the act of plagiarism only because an imaginary person, with
authority to speak for the university, would demand that I do so and
would thereby communicate both his desire that I do so and that he,
the one in authority, is communicating this to me. Of course, nobody
actually does this. But perhaps I have a reason to report only
because such an imaginary person would. Perhaps this is right. But
one should not acquiesce to such a claim without further argument.
In fact, Darwall offers an argument, a form of inference to the
best explanation. It turns out, he thinks, that if we construe a very
large class of reasons as second-personal reasons in his sense, and, in
particular, the moral reasons, then we are able to explain a wide
15. The fact that Darwall takes membership in the first category to entail membership in the
second suggests that he, too, uses the term in this way. See id. at 8.
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range of their more peculiar characteristics (for instance, in the case
of moral reasons, their "overridingness"). 6 While I could quarrel
with this argument in places, I will not here, for I think the idea of
second-personal address of second-personal reasons is of great
importance both to morality and the law, even if it should turn out
that Darwall overstates its range of application.
C. Successful Second-Personal Address of Second-Personal Reasons
The notion of the second-personal address of second-personal
reasons can be put to use in a number of different ways. To see the
uses to which it can be put, it helps to reflect on what must be true
for an act of second-personal address of a second-personal reason to
be successful. A first point to note is that the addresser must stand in
relations of authority or accountability that confer on him a power to
give the addressee a reason to act. Where there are no such relations,
there cannot be a successful act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason.
This observation alone provides us with a tool for systematically
distinguishing between coercive and non-coercive transactions
among people. If A has power over B, but no authority, and he exer-
cises that power by threatening B and thereby gives B a reason to
perform some act, has A performed an act of the second-personal
address of a second-personal reason? No: the power that A has to
generate reasons for B through an act of second-personal address
does not derive from authority and accountability relations between
A and B, but simply from the fact that A has a bigger stick than B.
But it is important to see the similarity between successful acts of
coercion and acts of second-personal address of second-personal
reasons. In particular, acts of coercion are often acts of second-
personal address of reasons: the coercer communicates to the coercee
that he has a reason to act, and he communicates that he is the one
communicating this. Often this act of communication is, in fact, an
exercise of a power on the coercer's part to give the coercee a reason
to so act. Such acts differ from acts of second-personal address of
second-personal reasons only in the source of the power of the
addresser to give the addressee reasons.
16. See, e.g., id. at 26-28.
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What else is required for an act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason to be successful? Certain powers are
required of the addresser. Most importantly, the addresser must
stand in relations of authority and accountability that actually confer
upon him a power to generate a reason for the relevant action
through an act of second-personal address. Further, a great deal is
required of the addressee. In general, a communicative act will be
successful only if the addressee has the capacities necessary to
understand what the addresser aims to communicate, and has the
capacities necessary to extract the information he aims to
communicate from the medium through which he communicates it.
We do not succeed in telling small children about the relative pros
and cons of various foreign policies because they are not yet
equipped to understand. And we do not succeed in communicating
in English when we speak to those who do not speak it even if they
are well-equipped to understand what we are attempting to convey.
Similarly, for a second-personal act of communication of a second-
personal reason to be effective, the addressee, B, must have the
capacity to understand the following pieces of information and the
capacity to extract them from the medium in which they are
conveyed to him by A: (1) B has a reason to do some act X; (2) A is
conveying that reason to do act X to B; (3) A has the power to
generate a reason for B to do X through engaging in an act of second-
personal address of such a reason; and (4) A's act of communicating
with B now is such an act.
This is a lot, but it is not all that needs to be true for the second-
personal address of a second-personal reason to be successful. The
reason is that the communication of a reason ordinarily has an aim
quite different from the communication of non-normative
information; it is not intended merely to induce bare understanding,
although that is part of what is intended. It is also intended to induce
action, or at least deliberation that involves the weighing of the
communicated reason. Imagine that A has the authority to issue
orders to B and orders B to do X. B understands that he is being
addressed by A, that A has the authority to generate a reason for him
to do X by addressing him as he is, and even that he now has a reason
to do X. But he goes on to deliberate about whether or not to do X
without even taking into account the fact that A demanded that he do
so. Has B really understood what was communicated? What answer
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one is drawn to probably depends on what one means by
"understanding" and what one takes "understanding that one has a
reason to X' to consist in. But this much is certainly true: there has
not been the kind of practical incorporation intended by A of the
information that A communicated. A necessary condition of this sort
of practical incorporation-a term designed to be a catch-all for the
special sort of uptake of reasons that we find in successful cases of
the communication of reasons-is the capacity for the relevant sort
of practical incorporation, a sort that at least involves the strong
consideration of the reason in further relevant deliberations about
what to do.
Darwall links this sort of capacity with freedom of the will. 7
His idea is that the kind of freedom required for moral responsibility
is just the sort that is required of the addressee for the second-
personal address of a second-personal reason (of the sort involved in
morality) to be successful. The chain of ideas runs roughly as
follows: a moral reason is a second-personal reason; a second-
personal reason depends for its validity upon the possibility of its
being communicated through an act of second-personal address; such
a possibility requires that the addressee have a variety of capacities
for grasping the reason and allowing it a place in deliberation and the
guidance of action; such capacities are what we term "freedom of
will."
This last step is the most difficult in the chain. It is far from
clear that there is the sort of alignment between the capacities that
are required on the part of the addressee if an act of second-personal
address of a second-personal reason is to be successful and the set of
capacities that we ordinarily tag "freedom of will." Part of the
problem is that our concept of freedom appears to be both less and
more than our concept of the set of capacities necessary for moral
responsibility: less in that we also take people to need a variety of
non-volitional, cognitive capacities to be rightly held responsible,
and more in that we take morally accountable creatures to vary from
one another in their degree of freedom. Darwall makes an effort to
address this concern, however, in the most valiant defense yet of an
already valiantly defended claim, namely, Kant's so-called "reci-
procity thesis," according to which freedom is not just necessary for
17. Id. at 213-42, 277-99.
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subjection to the moral law, but sufficient for it as well. 8 If the
reciprocity thesis is true, and if it is also true that moral judgments
are a species of second-personal address of a second-personal reason,
then it would be no surprise that the capacities of the addressee
required for an act of moral address to be successful would be just
the capacities that are necessary and sufficient for freedom of will.
However, whether or not Darwall's defense of the reciprocity
thesis, and his corresponding defense of the claim that what is
presupposed by at least one species (namely the moral species) of the
second-personal address of second-personal reasons is freedom of
will, is successful is a question we can sidestep here. Darwall is
certainly right that there are a variety of capacities that are required
by the addressee (as well as by the addresser) for the second-personal
address of a second-personal reason to be successful, and only this
much will be important to what follows.
One of the more interesting capacities on the part of the
addressee that is required for a successful act of second-personal
address of a second-personal reason is expressed in what Darwall
calls "Pufendorf's Point."' 9 Darwall often refers to a passage from
Pufendorf as an expression of the idea. In the passage, Pufendorf is
describing the distinctive way in which an obligation "acts on the
will." He writes: "[A]n obligation ... forces a man to acknowledge
of himself that the evil, which has been pointed out to the person
who deviates from an announced rule, falls upon him justly... "20
The idea that Darwall takes from the passage is this: a person is
under an obligation to act in a particular way only if she has the
capacity to recognize that it would be just for her to suffer censure
should she fail to act that way.2' Put another way: a necessary
condition of violating an obligation is the capacity to recognize that
one has violated an obligation (and is therefore justly subject to
censure for so doing). We can only hold people to standards to
which they can recognize themselves to be rightly held.
18. See id. at 29-38. There is a great deal of secondary literature on the reciprocity thesis.
For a start, see H.J. PATON, THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT'S MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (Harper & Row 1967) (1947), and Henry E. Allison, Morality and Freedom: Kant's
Reciprocity Thesis, 95 PHIL. REV. 393 (1986).
19. See, e.g., DARWALL, supra note 7, at 22-25, 107-15.
20. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 91 (James Brown Scott
ed., C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Oceana Publications, Inc. 1964) (1688).
21. See, e.g., DARWALL, supra note 7, at 23.
REASONABLENESS IN THE LA W
Pufendorf's Point has great appeal. The idea is that moral
obligation requires the capacity to look at oneself in the mirror and,
at once, to both look with disapproval and to see oneself looked upon
with disapproval by oneself. This is a recurrent idea in much
Western literature, a fact which, itself, suggests the deep
entrenchment of the idea in Western moral thought. To take just one
striking and obvious example, consider H.G. Wells's The Invisible
Man.22 In the story, the Invisible Man does not just become invis-
ible; he also becomes an amoralist. Why? Why should invisibility
be accompanied by amoralism? Why would invisibility not make
one, by contrast, that much more benevolent? The answer is that the
invisible are invisible also to themselves and so lack the capacity to
look upon themselves with disapproval; this lack of self-scrutiny
undermines their capacity to be governed by moral norms.
At one point in the story, the Invisible Man is telling a friend,
Kemp, how he assaulted an innocent man in his own home solely for
the purpose of advancing his personal ends. Kemp gives him a look
of disapproval, and the Invisible Man replies:
"My dear Kemp, it's no good your sitting and glaring as
though I was a murderer. It had to be done. He had his
revolver. If once he saw me he would be able to describe
me-"
"But still," said Kemp, "in England-today. And the
man was in his own house, and you were-well, robbing."
"Robbing! Confound it! You'll call me a thief next!
Surely, Kemp, you're not fool enough to dance on the old
strings. Can't you see my position?"
"And his too," said Kemp.
The Invisible Man stood up sharply. "What do you
mean to say?"
Kemp's face grew a trifle hard. He was about to speak
and checked himself....
• .."You don't blame me, do you? You don't blame
me?"
"I never blame anyone," said Kemp. "It's quite out of
22. H.G. WELLS, THE INVISIBLE MAN (Patrick Parrinder ed., Penguin Books 2005) (1897).
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fashion."23
Of course, Kemp does blame the Invisible Man, but the Invisible
Man, invisible also to himself, is unable to see himself as to blame.
Even though he sees the look of disapproval in Kemp's eyes, what he
lacks is the ability to turn that look upon himself and with that
inability comes the inability to be subject to action-guiding
obligations.
One might accept Pufendorf's Point without accepting the claim
that obligation is best analyzed through appeal to the notion of the
second-personal address of second-personal reasons. Darwall
suggests, however, that Pufendorf's Point can be derived from the
notion of second-personal address of a second-personal reason, and
this fact lends support to the contention that our ordinary notion of
obligation is intertwined with this sort of communicative act.24 His
idea is that, for such an act of communication to be successful, the
addressee must have the capacity to address the relevant reason to
herself.
What is the argument for this claim? Notice that Pufendorf' s
Point does not fall out of the notion of second-personal address of
just any reason. If, for reasons quite independent of any authority or
accountability relations between people, A mistakenly thinks it is in
B's best interests to do X, it would be much better for B not to do X,
and B knows this. And say that B knows, and A knows that B knows,
that A truly has B's best interests at heart. When A says to B, "You
should do X," A very well might be intending to communicate not
just that doing X is in B's best interests, but also that he, A, is
communicating this to B. After all, it is in part because this advice is
coming from A, whom both A and B know to have B's best interests
at heart, that A's advice is to be taken very seriously, and A might
want to communicate this to B. A is engaging in the second-personal
address of a reason: his is an act of second-personal address since
one of the things that he is aiming to communicate is that he is the
one communicating with B. And A is communicating a reason-he
is telling B that B has a reason to do X and, because this advice is
coming from A, that he has a reason to take the advice very seriously.
This act of communication might be completely successful, however,
23. Id. at 118.
24. DARWALL, supra note 7, at 23-24.
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even if B, knowing as he does that he has no reason at all to do X and
even strong reason not to do it, is completely incapable of
recognizing himself to be justly censured for failing to give the
reason weight in his deliberations. B is not capable of recognizing
this since it is not in fact true, and knowing what he knows rules out
the possibility of his mistakenly believing that it is.
What this example shows is that, if Pufendorf's Point is to be
derived from the notion of the second-personal address of second-
personal reasons, it must be by appeal to the fact that what are
addressed are second-personal reasons, and not just reasons. In
short, it must be that the capacity to recognize the justice in one's
being held to a particular standard must be required for the
successful second-personal address of a second-personal reason,
even though it is not required for the successful second-personal
address of every reason. The distinctive feature of second-personal
reasons is that they are generated by the act of addressing them: that
act is the exercise of the power to generate a reason to act, a power
deriving from authority or accountability relations between addresser
and addressee. This is not true in the example just described in
which A takes himself merely to be reporting what reasons he takes B
to have to do X and not to be generating, through the reporting, any
such reasons. Perhaps this distinctive feature is the key to seeing
how Pufendorf's Point falls out of the notion of the second-personal
address of second-personal reasons.
In fact it is. The point of an addresser using second-personal
address, and thereby communicating that he is communicating with
the addressee, is that he thereby places the addressee on notice that
the act of communication is itself an exercise of the addresser's
power to generate reasons for the addressee to act. The act of
address would not succeed in providing such notice if the addressee
were not capable of recognizing the authority or accountability
relation that conferred the relevant power on the addresser. But the
power to recognize that relation, and the power to recognize that the
addresser is exercising it through the act of address, just amount to
the power to which Pufendorf points-the power to recognize
oneself as justly subject to censure should one fail to practically
incorporate the addressed reason.
In short, if the reasons to act that are provided by moral
obligations are second-personal reasons, then it is no surprise that a
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person is under a moral obligation-he is given that distinctive sort
of reason to act or omit acting-only if he has the capacity to
recognize the legitimacy of his being censured for a failure to
respond. In fact, the derivation of Pufendorf's Point from the notion
of second-personal address suggests that it is not special to moral
obligation. From what has been said it follows that a person has a
second-personal reason to do something only if he is in a position to
recognize the justice of censure for failure on his part to respond to
the reason. If some set of legal reasons, or even prudential reasons,
are second-personal, then this will be just as true of them as it is of
moral reasons.
Recall the hypothesis to be discussed in this paper: the law is
justified in appealing to reasonableness where, and only where, it is
implementing or regulating an act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason. We are now in a position to understand this
hypothesis. Reasonableness is justifiably invoked in the law when
the term "reasonable" refers to one or more of the capacities required
by either addressee or addresser if the background act of second-
personal address of a second-personal reason is to be successful. In
the next two sections, this article will explore this idea in action.
III. THE "REASONABLE" STANDARD:
AN EXAMPLE OF AN APPROPRIATE USE
In our tort law, a defendant is liable for negligently causing a
plaintiffs injury only if a reasonable person would have taken some
precaution which would have prevented the injury.25 The fundamen-
tal question about reasonable person standards with which this paper
is concerned can be phrased in the context of negligence in tort like
this: why must the relevant untaken precaution have been reasonable
rather than rational or prudent, morally obligatory or morally
permitted, or possessing some other characteristic altogether? Of all
the various features that the untaken precaution might reflect, why
does the law single out reasonableness as the crucial feature? In
short, what, if anything, makes an appeal to reasonableness in
negligence law particularly apt or justified?
It might appear that this question cannot be answered without a
definition of reasonableness in this context. We need to know what
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965).
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it is to say that an untaken precaution was reasonable in order to
know why the law is concerned with reasonableness. The project of
defining the relevant notion of reasonableness-the project of
drawing the line between reasonable and unreasonable untaken
precautions-must be addressed prior to justifying negligence law's
appeal to what reasonable persons would do. My approach here,
however, travels in exactly the opposite direction. We start by
defending a justificatory hypothesis, a good reason for appealing to
reasonableness in assessing negligence in tort. This justification
provides a tool for determining which untaken precautions are
reasonable and which are not: the reasonable precautions are all, and
only, those that are justified by the law's appeal to reasonableness.
It is a fact, and a non-obvious fact, that the question before the
court in any negligence case is whether or not to make successful the
plaintiffs act of second-personal address of a second-personal
reason. If the plaintiff wins the case, then (in most cases) the
defendant has to pay damages and, therefore, has a new and powerful
reason henceforth to take the precaution he failed to take. One of the
downstream consequences, therefore, of the defendant's failure to
take the relevant precaution is the damages paid to the plaintiff.
Given that this is one of the consequences of that omission, the
defendant had reason to take, rather than omit, the relevant
precaution. We need not assume that the reason for taking the
precaution provided by the assignment of damages is solely the
callous financial motive: the assignment of damages also marks the
defendant's failure to take the precaution as something of which the
state disapproves. That disapproval itself, or even what it indicates
about the nature of the failure, might supply the defendant with a
new reason to take the untaken precaution in the future. Conversely,
if the court decides for the defendant, then the plaintiffs suit has
given the defendant no new reason for taking the suggested
precaution.
In short, the court must decide whether to give the defendant a
new reason to have taken the precaution. By virtue of the authority
relation between the state and the defendant, the court has the power
to give the defendant a reason for action through an act of addressing
the defendant. By saying to the defendant, "You must pay damages
to the plaintiff," the court thereby gives the defendant reason to do
something. Further, and importantly, in deciding for the plaintiff, the
Spring 2007]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:939
court in any civil case is acting on behalf of the plaintiff. The court
is enacting the plaintiffs request for damages. In this sense, when
the court decides for the plaintiff, the plaintiff successfully conveys
to the defendant, "You had a reason to take a precaution that would
have prevented my injuries." And by saying that, it comes to be the
case that the defendant does indeed have such a reason.
And yet further, it is important that this act of address
communicates to the defendant that the plaintiff himself is
communicating this to him; it is to the plaintiff that damages are to
be paid, and not merely to some insurance fund, say, from which the
plaintiff is to be compensated. By bringing suit and obtaining a
verdict against the defendant, the plaintiff has exercised a power to
give the defendant a reason to take the precaution he failed to take.
The plaintiff exercises that power by engaging in an act of second-
personal address of the defendant.
When the court therefore decides for the plaintiff, all the
elements of a successful act of second-personal address of a second-
personal reason are in place. There is an authority relation between
the state and the defendant and between the state and the plaintiff.
As a result of this relation, the plaintiff can be empowered to give the
defendant a reason for action. The plaintiff exercises this power by
addressing the defendant. And one of the things that the plaintiff
communicates through this act of address is that he, the plaintiff, is
communicating with the defendant. Put this way, then, we can see a
negligence case (and, really, any case in private law) as an effort on
the part of a plaintiff to successfully execute an act of second-
personal address of a second-personal reason. The question before
the court in any such case is whether or not to make the plaintiffs
effort successful.
As we saw in Part II, for an act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason to be successful, the addressee must possess
a number of capacities. First, the addressee must have the capacity
to understand and practically incorporate the reason. And, as we saw
in Pufendorf s Point, the addressee must have the capacity to
recognize the justice of his suffering censure for failing to respond to
the reason given. If the defendant lacks these capacities, then the
plaintiffs attempt will necessarily fail; there will be no way for the
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plaintiff to successfully perform an act of second-personal address of
a second-personal reason.26
This tempts one to suggest that by appealing to reasonableness
in negligence cases, the law distinguishes those defendants who have
the capacities required for the plaintiffs attempted act of second-
personal address to be successful from those who do not. According
to this tempting line, "reasonable" in negligence law means
"possessing those capacities required by the addressee if an act of
second-personal address of a second-personal reason is to be
successful." But, in fact, this temptation should be resisted, for
negligence law does not ask if the defendant was reasonable, but,
rather, if the precaution was reasonable.
This is not to say that the capacities of the defendant are
ignored. Quite to the contrary, negligence law's appeal to the
foreseeability of the harm, for instance, is arguably intended to
identify at least some defendants (namely those who could not
foresee the harm) who could not play their part as addressee in a
successful act of second-personal address of the relevant second-
personal reason. But, still, it does not appear that reasonableness is
being used by negligence law to identify the defendants who have
the needed capacities. It is being used for some other purpose.
To see what purpose reasonableness serves in negligence law,
note that even if the defendant has the capacities required for the act
of second-personal address to be successful, the act might still
necessarily fail, for it is possible that any plaintiff's act of second
personal address could not supply the reason for the precaution in
question, no matter what the defendant's capacities. This could
happen if the relations of authority and accountability between
defendant, plaintiff, and state do not provide the plaintiff with the
power to create a reason for the defendant to take that precaution.
This suggests that, by asking if the precaution was reasonable, the
court is asking whether an act of second-personal address of a reason
26. See supra Part II.C. It is important to see that even if the defendant lacks one or more of
the capacities required of the addressee in a successful act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason, the court could still give the defendant a reason to have taken the
precaution: The assignment of damages alone provides a powerful reason. But in so doing, the
court would not thereby be making successful the plaintiffs effort to perform an act of second-
personal address of a second-personal reason. A wrongly decided case, then, might have just this
failing: It might involve the assignment of damages to a defendant without thereby making
successful any act of second-personal address of a second-personal reason.
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to take that precaution would have been successful were the
defendant invested with the basic capacities necessary to make it
successful. If the answer is "no," then the court must decide for the
defendant, for the thing that the plaintiff is trying to do in bringing
suit-namely perform an act of second-personal address of a second-
personal reason to take the precaution-cannot be done.
This brings us to the justification of the appeal to reasonableness
in negligence law: what makes the law's appeal to reasonableness in
this context appropriate is the nature of the very activity in which the
court is engaged in negligence cases. Since the court is trying to
decide whether or not to make the plaintiffs attempted act of
second-personal address of a second-personal reason successful, the
court must determine if the act could possibly be successful. And so
the court needs to know if a person with the capacities required by
the addressee in a successful act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason would have come to have a reason to take the
precaution by the act of address. This is what the court is exploring
by asking if the untaken precaution was reasonable.
The court is trying to determine if the precaution is reason-
eligible, we might say. Is the precaution the sort of thing that could
have been given further support by reasons through the plaintiff's act
of second-personal address of a second-personal reason? If, for
instance, taking the precaution would have been degrading for the
defendant, or would have required him to act in a self-destructive
way, or would have placed other parties at equal or greater risk of
equal or greater injury, then (quite possibly) it is not something that
the plaintiff is invested with the power to demand of him. In such
cases, the plaintiffs attempted act of second-personal address would
necessarily fail even if the defendant, the potential addressee, has all
the capacities needed to make it successful. In short, it is appropriate
for the law to appeal to reasonableness in this context because the
task which the court must undertake requires that the court determine
if the relevant untaken precaution is the sort of thing that one citizen
is empowered to demand of another by the authority and
accountability relations in which the parties and the state stand. Put
roughly, the question of whether or not the precaution is reasonable
is just the question of whether the plaintiff has the right to demand
that the defendant take it.
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Different moral theories will provide different answers to that
question. If we hold, as Darwall does, that the adequacy of a moral
theory is assessed by examining the degree to which it does justice to
the idea that moral reasons are second-personal reasons addressed by
a particular sort of addresser, 7 then we would not want to stop here.
We would want, instead, to determine what moral theories do and do
not meet this constraint. Then we would use the moral theories that
meet this constraint to determine whether the plaintiff has the right to
demand that the defendant take some precaution that would have
averted the injury. But this is to extend the notion of second-
personal address of a second-personal reason beyond the boundaries
needed for our purposes here. Whatever the best moral theory, and
whatever the relationship between the best moral theory and the idea
of the second-personal address of a second-personal reason, what we
have learned is that the role of reasonableness in negligence serves to
put a moral question before the court. What reasonableness is doing
in this part of negligence law is focusing the court's attention on that
moral question.
It is worth grounding this abstract discussion through
consideration of a case. Consider the famous case of Davis v.
Consolidated Rail Corp.,28 the case in which Judge Posner applies
the "Hand Formula" to determine the reasonableness of the various
precautions that the defendant failed to take. Davis was an inspector
who crawled under a train and was injured when the conductor,
unaware of his presence, moved the train without first (1) walking
the length of the train to see if anyone was under it; (2) ringing the
train's bell; or (3) blowing the train's horn. 29 By applying the Hand
Formula, Posner reaches the conclusion that (1) and (2) were
unreasonable. In the case of (1) the burden to Conrail was too high,
while in the case of (2) the probability of averting injury was too
low.3" Functionally, this methodology determines that a precaution is
reasonable where, and only where, it has positive expected social
27. Darwall, supra note 7, at 27 ("I develop this theme and argue that any account of the
distinctive normativity of moral obligation that fails to capture this second-personal element is
deficient.").
28. 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 1262-64. Posner also briefly considers and dismisses the fact that no Conrail
employee informed the conductor that there was an unknown man on the premises. Id. at 1263.
30. Id. at 1264-65.
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utility. If the approach to reasonableness advocated here is correct,
then Posner arguably reaches the right conclusions. He is even
justified in using the Hand Formula to reach them, but not for
anything like the reasons that he accepts.
Davis should not be construed merely as trying to get
compensation for his injuries, but, instead, to be attempting to
exercise a power to give Conrail a reason to take a precaution. He
tries to do this by addressing a demand to Conrail, a demand in
which he communicates to Conrail that he, Davis, has been injured
and is, on those grounds, making that demand. Davis is attempting
to induce a very particular form of recognition from Conrail: he is
attempting to make Conrail recognize a reason to take a precaution
and recognize that Davis himself, by virtue of his injury, has and has
exercised a power to give Conrail that reason.
But Davis has no right to demand that Conrail require an
employee to walk the length of the train every time the train moves,
precaution (1) stated above, or that Conrail ring a bell every time
each train moves, precaution (2) in the case. Davis has no right to
demand (1) because he has no right to demand that Conrail take a
precaution that would result in an inconvenience greater than his
injury could have been expected to be. And he has no right to
demand (2) because he has no right to demand that Conrail behave in
a way which was so unlikely to have averted his injuries, given their
magnitude. But he has every right to demand (3), that Conrail blow
each train's horn before moving it, precisely because he has the right
to demand that Conrail appreciate its workers' safety to such a
degree as to undertake burdens small enough to be outweighed by
the expected injury.
The Hand Formula therefore provides us with an excellent
guideline for determining whether or not a precaution is reasonable.
But it provides us with this guideline because it provides us with a
rough guide for determining what people have the right to demand of
others when they stand in roughly reciprocal relationships of
authority and accountability. This is the relevant issue because
plaintiffs in negligence suits are attempting to perform an act of
second-personal address of a second-personal reason. Such an act
requires that the addresser, the plaintiff, has, in virtue of the authority
and accountability relations in which he stands with the defendant,
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the power to give the defendant a reason in that way, through an act
of second-personal address.
Notice that the Hand Formula can be distorting in cases in which
the plaintiff and defendant stand in non-reciprocal relations of
authority and accountability. For example, the fact that it is either
customary or standard in a particular profession to fail to take a
certain precaution often counts in favor of the defendant in
negligence cases." The result is that a precaution can be
unreasonable even though taking it had positive expected social
utility.
It therefore follows that the Hand Formula does not supply a
sufficient condition for reasonableness across the board. The
hypothesis under discussion here-namely, that the appeal to
reasonableness in negligence is justified because the court is trying to
determine if the plaintiff has the authority to demand that the
defendant take the precaution-provides an explanation for this.
What matters is what the plaintiff has power to demand as a result of
the authority and accountability relations in which he and the
defendant stand. If those relations are entirely reciprocal, then the
Hand Formula provides us with a good guide for determining if the
untaken precaution was reasonable. But when the defendant also
stands in a relation of accountability to a profession as a whole, or to
a group of people conforming to a customary standard of behavior,
then the plaintiffs power to demand precautions of him can be
weaker. The fact that the hypothesis under consideration here
provides this explanation counts as further evidence for it.
This section applies a recipe of sorts for determining what a
particular reasonable person standard is doing in the law, and,
correlatively, an account of what is and is not reasonable under the
law in question. We start by taking seriously the idea that where
there is an appeal to reasonableness in the law, there is an act of
second-personal address of a second-personal reason, the success of
which requires various capacities on the parts of addresser and
addressee. We then look at a particular appeal to reasonableness (in
this case, the appeal to it in negligence in tort) and we try to
determine which party's capacities are in question (in this case,
surprisingly, the plaintiffs) and precisely what capacities the law is
31. See, e.g., T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d. Cir. 1932).
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concerned with (in this case, the capacity to give another person a
reason to take the particular precaution at issue). This gives us, then,
both a justification for the law's appeal to reasonableness-it is
required by the law's involvement with the second-personal address
of second-personal reasons-and an account of what reasonableness
means in the relevant domain-it means one or more of those
capacities that are required for the particular act of second-personal
address with which the law is entwined.
In the case of negligence in tort, we discover that the law is
justified in appealing to reasonableness because what is before the
court is the question of whether or not to make successful the
plaintiff's attempt to engage in an act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason for the defendant to take the identified
precaution. And we discover that the reasonable in this domain is
just what citizens have the right to demand of each other given the
authority and accountability relations in which they stand, and in
which they stand with the state. While this does not provide us with
a practicable test for determining which precautions are reasonable
or unreasonable, it tells us, at least, what hard question we are trying
to answer when making that determination.
One of the morals of this section is that taking seriously the idea
of the second-personal address of second-personal reasons provides
us with a form of self-understanding: it helps us understand what we
are really doing in appealing to reasonableness in the law. This self-
understanding, in turn, helps us understand how an appeal to
reasonableness ought to proceed in a particular domain. It helps us
to see, that is, what is and is not reasonable in a particular domain.
In the next section, we will explore a different way in which the
notion of the second-personal address of second-personal reasons can
help us understand an appeal to reasonableness: it can help us
understand what went wrong in appeals to reasonableness in defining
the element of force in rape law.
IV. THE "REASONABLE" STANDARD:
AN EXAMPLE OF AN INAPPROPRIATE USE
In many jurisdictions, it is not sufficient for rape for A to have
had sexual contact with B without B's consent. In addition, the act
must have been accomplished through force or threat of force.
Further, in a diminishing number of jurisdictions, to determine if
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there is a threat of force, the jury must consider what a reasonable
person would think or feel. In particular, in many jurisdictions, the
jury must determine whether or not a reasonable person would have
believed herself to have been in danger of serious harm given the
defendant's actions.32 Call this "the requirement of reasonable fear."
This requirement is relevant only where a complainant, usually a
woman, has had some kind of sexual contact with a defendant,
usually a man, not as a result of the application of physical force, but
instead because she came to believe that she or another would suffer
some serious harm if she did not submit.33
The requirement of reasonable fear makes it harder to convict
some defendants and easier to convict others. Under the require-
ment, force that causes the complainant to subjectively believe
herself to be in danger is not enough, even if the defendant knew that
she had this belief and acted so as to induce it. If a reasonable person
would not have felt sufficient fear to submit, then there was no rape.
In this sense, then, the doctrine protects the defendant. In particular,
defendants who induce a complainant to comply by exploiting her
tendency to believe herself to be in great danger when a reasonable
person would not have that belief are not guilty of rape under this
doctrine. On the other hand, a defendant could be convicted if it
would have been reasonable for the complainant to have believed
herself to be in danger, even if she did not in fact have that belief.
Hence, as a result of its appeal to reasonableness, the doctrine
makes it unnecessary for the state to convince the jury that the
32. See generally Roberts v. State, 530 S.E.2d 535, 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that "a
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm" is an adequate jury instruction); State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d
720, 727 (Md. 1981) (stating that most jurisdictions require that the victim reasonably fear the
assailant to prove the element of force); Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 677-78
(Mass. 2001) (noting that to prove a rape charge, "[i]t is sufficient that the Commonwealth prove
that the victim reasonably feared that the defendant would harm her if she did not submit"); State
v. Roberts, 235 S.E.2d 203, 211 (N.C. 1977) ("The mere threat of serious bodily harm which
reasonably induces fear thereof constitutes the requisite force."); Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510
A.2d 1217, 1220, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (the criminal code for rape identifies "person of reasonable
resolution"); Schrum v. Commonwealth, 246 S.E.2d 893, 896 (Va. 1978) (holding that a "victim
is not required to resist ... if she reasonably believes that resistance ... would be useless");
Tryon v. State, 567 P.2d 290, 292 (Wyo. 1977) (finding no consent if "induced by fear or
reasonable apprehension of severe bodily harm").
33. The threat of force element intersects in confusing ways with the element of non-
consent. To avoid conceptual confusion in the doctrine, it must be possible to acquiesce to a
threat of force without thereby consenting. Exactly what conception of consent is required in
order to maintain this distinction is a difficult question. The discussion to follow assumes that
some appropriate notion of consent could, in principle, be delineated.
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complainant was actually afraid or acted from any actual fear. In this
sense, the reasonable person standard operating here protects the
complainant by removing from her a burden to act frightened, or to
in any way communicate her fear to her assailant or others. The jury
can convict even if nothing the complainant did indicates at all, much
less beyond a reasonable doubt, that she believed herself to be in
serious danger of harm.
It is an empirical question whether defendants or complainants
end up with greater protection from a legal regime that accepts the
requirement of reasonable fear. Although my hunch is that
defendants receive the greater protections, a more powerful critique
of the use of the reasonable person in this context would show that it
is illegitimate even if empirical studies were to point in favor of the
victims. That is, if it can be shown that the use of the reasonable
person is illegitimate regardless of whether defendants or
complainants are given greater protections, then there would be good
reason to reject such a legal regime quite independently of any
empirical results. This section argues for just this point by appeal to
the justificatory hypothesis under consideration in this paper. My
claim is that the requirement of reasonable fear makes sense only if
one mistakenly thinks that for the defendant to be guilty, the
complainant must be the addressee of some act of second-personal
address of a second-personal reason. And, since no such act is
justifiably required for the defendant's guilt, there is no legitimate
place here for the law to appeal to reasonableness.
To see why things go wrong in the requirement of reasonable
fear, consider a similar place in the law in which reasonableness has
a legitimate role to play, namely, in the affirmative defense of duress.
The Model Penal Code ("MPC"), for instance, requires for the
defense that the defendant show not just that he acted as accused
from coercion but also that "a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist" the coercive pressure
applied to him. 4 This requirement of reasonable firmness runs
exactly parallel to the requirement of reasonable fear in rape. In both
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962). The MPC does not accept the requirement of
reasonable fear in its definition of rape, see id. § 213.1 (1), but accepts something very close to it
in its definition of the crime of "Gross Sexual Imposition," see id. § 213.1(2). There, instead of
requiring that the fear be reasonable, the MPC requires that the threat would have prompted
compliance from a "woman of ordinary resolution." Id. § 213.1(2). The practical effect of this
requirement, however, is much the same as the requirement of reasonable fear.
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cases, the requirement is not met if a reasonable recipient of a threat
would not have complied with the threatener's demand. It might
appear, then, that the two requirements should stand or fall together.
If there is some good reason for the requirement of reasonable
firmness, then perhaps there is also some good reason for the
requirement of reasonable fear, and vice versa. As we will see,
however, there is a good reason for the requirement of reasonable
firmness, and that reason does not extend to the requirement of
reasonable fear.
Notice another parallel between duress doctrine and rape
doctrine: both appeal to reasonableness in an attempt to delineate the
same very particular class of actions performed in response to
pressures supplied by another. A can get B to do what he wants in a
whole variety of different ways. For example, A can bypass B's will
by throwing B to the ground. If B behaves illegally in response to
pressures of this sort-ordinarily physical pressures-then B has
failed to meet the act requirement, and so is not criminally
responsible. Duress never comes into play. Similarly, if B finds
herself in sexual contact with A as a result of this kind of pressure-
if, for instance, A attacks B in a parking lot and overpowers her-
then the force requirement is met without any discussion of the
requirement of reasonable fear, for there is no need to discuss
whether or not B was responding to a threat of force. On the other
end of the spectrum, A can also get B to do what he wants by making
it worthwhile to B. Many cases of illegal behavior performed in
response to such pressures will rise to the level of justifications. This
will be so, for instance, if A makes it the case that a rational and
moral person is at least permitted, and maybe even required, to act
criminally. Think, for instance, of committing a robbery in order to
prevent a loved one from being murdered by another, or submitting
to sexual contact for an analogous reason.
While the duress doctrine does serve to excuse people in cases
like this-if a rational and moral person would have done as the
defendant did then, clearly, a person of "reasonable firmness" would
have as well-the duress doctrine is not devised for cases of this
kind. Under the MPC, for instance, such a person can escape respon-
sibility by noting that he was justified in acting as he did,35 and never
35. Id. §§ 3.01-3.11.
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needs to show that he was under duress. Such cases are well over the
bar of "reasonable firmness." Analogously, if the defendant has
placed the complainant in a position in which a moral and rational
person would have submitted to the relevant sexual contact, then
there has been a threat of force of the sort required to meet the
reasonable fear requirement. But in both cases, the pressures exerted
might not be such as to sail over the bar of reasonable firmness or
reasonable fear for the requirement to be met.
There are closer cases, such as cases in which the defendant
lacks a justification but was still under duress, or, correlatively, cases
in which a perfectly rational or moral person would not have
submitted as the complainant did but in which there was the threat of
force needed for rape. Both the requirement of reasonable firmness
and of reasonable fear are intended to capture a set of cases in which
someone less than perfectly rational or perfectly moral, but
possessing frailties much like anyone else's, would have given in.
Such people are thought to be given a defense of duress by the
requirement of reasonable firmness and are thought to be protected
against sexual contact to which they do not consent by the
requirement of reasonable fear. In such cases, we might very well
recognize that the person did not do the right thing-she should not
have complied-but we nonetheless see her acquiescence as having
been due more to the person who pressured her than to herself.
Why should the law include the requirement of reasonable
firmness in its definition of duress? A first and natural answer to this
question fails, despite its appeal. We might think that the appeal to
reasonableness here is helping to distinguish those who are weaker
than we demand them to be from those who meet normative
expectations in this regard. The latter class of defendants are given a
defense, but not the former, because those who are not of
"reasonable firmness" are thought to be at fault for being weak. The
problem is that failure to meet a normative standard is not sufficient
for being at fault for that failure: among other things, some people
fail to meet standards because of factors largely or entirely outside of
their control. In fact, the defense of duress is designed with one class
of such people in mind: the defendant failed to meet a normative
standard, but he is given the opportunity to present a defense of
duress precisely because we think those who have not met standards
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may still not be at fault. Among other things, they may have failed
to meet them because they were under duress.
So, the defense of duress itself enshrines in law the rejection of
the claim that failure to meet a standard is sufficient for being at fault
for that failure. To impose a second standard-a person must be of
"reasonable firmness"-as part of the defense itself without allowing
defendants the opportunity to show that they failed to meet this
standard as a result of something that mitigates or eliminates their
responsibility for this failure is flatly hypocritical.
The framers of the MPC were aware of this sort of problem and
offered the following alternative justification for their appeal to
reasonable firmness in defining the defense of duress:
[The] law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed ... it is
hypocritical, if it imposes on the actor who has the
misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that
his judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and
could comply with if their turn to face the problem should
arise."
The idea is that it is a necessary condition of justifiably holding
someone accountable for failure to meet a legal standard that those
who are holding him could themselves claim to have met the
standard had they been in his position. This approach suggests that
"reasonable firmness" means "the degree of firmness of those who
are holding the defendant accountable." This approach leads us to
difficult questions about who, exactly, is holding the defendant
accountable-the judge? the jury? the people as a whole?-and
depending how we answer that question we will find ourselves with
different accounts of "reasonable firmness." But even if we assume
that such a question can be answered, the MPC's approach gives rise
to a question which does not have an immediate answer: why should
it be a necessary condition of legal accountability for failure that the
judges, whoever they are, would not have failed?
We often justifiably hold people to standards that we ourselves
could not have met. We often have good reasons for requiring others
to act better than we ourselves are capable of. Holders of public
office, for instance, are justifiably criticized for giving in to
temptations, financial and otherwise, that the very people justifiably
36. Id. § 2.09 cmt. 2 ("Proper scope of Defense").
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criticizing them would have accepted. Similarly, most of us have no
idea how we would have acted had we found ourselves in Rwanda,
say, at the wrong moment. We hope we would have acted well; but
our hopes may be vain. And yet we have every right to hold those
who committed atrocities there to account. Perhaps there is
something about legal accountability in particular that would help to
solve this problem. Perhaps the activity of justifiably holding
someone to account for failure to meet a legal standard-although
not every other kind of standard-requires that one can say that one
would have met that standard oneself in the circumstances. If this is
so, however, the case needs to be made to support the MPC's
proposed justification for appealing to "reasonable firmness" in
defining duress.
The hypothesis under consideration in this paper-that where
there is a justified appeal to reasonableness in the law there is an act
of second-personal address of a second-personal reason being
implemented or regulated-suggests a different justification for the
requirement of reasonable firmness. Recall Pufendorf's Point: A
person is not justifiably criticized for failure unless he has the
capacity to recognize the justice of such criticism.37 As was
suggested in Part II, Pufendorf's Point can be derived from the
notion of the second-personal address of a second-personal reason:
Such an act cannot be successful unless the person being addressed
has the capacity to recognize the justice of criticism should she fail to
practically incorporate the addressed reason for action.
Accordingly, the act of proclaiming a person guilty of a crime is
an act of second-personal address of a second-personal reason. By
assigning punishment, the court is exercising a power to give the
defendant a reason not to have acted as he did. In addition, the court
is communicating that reason to the defendant, and at the same time
is communicating to the defendant that the entity for which the court
speaks (the state or the people) is communicating this reason to him.
Furthermore, it is important that this last element be communicated
for it reminds the defendant that the entity exerting its power to give
him a reason has the authority to do so. It therefore follows that for
the court's proclamation of guilt to be successful, the defendant must
have the capacity to recognize the justice of his punishment.
37. See supra Part I.C.
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If, as is the case when the defense of duress arises, the defendant
acted as he did in response to a coercive threat from another party,
the defendant may lack the capacity to recognize the justice of his
punishment precisely because he believes that he acted in response to
a threat to undermine his responsibility. Such a person, if jailed for
his crime, might sit in his cell and say to himself, "I still would have
done the same thing, even if I had it all to do over again. I did my
best." He might really lack the capacity to see his act as having been
sufficiently under his control to be attributed to him. But sometimes
we recognize that even though we acted in response to a threat, we
are nonetheless responsible for acting as we did. We are sometimes
in a position to attribute the act to ourselves, and not to the person
who issued the threat. In such cases, the defendant did not merely
act freely in response to a threat while perfectly capable of resisting,
as is always the fact in duress cases.
In addition, in such cases the defendant recognizes, or could
recognize, that he responded wrongly to the pressures that he was
under. He recognizes that resistance was within his power. In such
cases, a person meets the necessary condition for censure specified
by Pufendorf's Point, even though he acted in response to a threat:
He maintains the capacity to recognize the justice of his
condemnation for acting as he did.
The requirement of reasonable firmness, I suggest, represents an
attempt to assess whether or not the defendant does indeed have this
capacity. The background question is a factual one regarding the
defendant's capacities. Is the defendant capable of a particular form
of regret for what he did? Is he capable of looking at his act and
recognizing that it is to be attributed to himself, and not to the
threatener? If he is not, then the act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason that the court is contemplating making-
namely, the proclamation of the defendant's guilt--cannot hope to be
successful: The defendant should be acquitted. But if he is, then the
court should ignore the fact that the defendant acted in response to a
threat, since the defendant maintains the capacity to recognize that
the threat was not analogous to a push from behind. The threat was
not genuinely incapacitating.
Under this approach, duress does not excuse because the
defendant was incapacitated by the threat. If that is the case, there
are other ways for the defendant to avoid criminal responsibility.
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Duress excuses if and only if the defendant cannot help but see the
threat that he was given as functioning just as though it was
incapacitating. Such a defendant lacks one of the capacities required
of the addressee if the court's contemplated act of second-personal
address of a second-personal reason is to be successful.
If what really needs to be assessed is whether the defendant has
the capacity to recognize that he was wrong to comply with the
threat, that his action is to be attributed to himself and not to the
threatener, why does the doctrine ask what a reasonable person
would have done when faced with the threat? The reason is that a
necessary condition of seeing oneself as at fault for what one did in
response to a threat is that a person who was responding properly to
his reasons for action-a person who recognized what reasons he had
and gave them the weight they deserved-would not have done so.
One cannot have the relevant capacity to hold oneself
accountable unless one can recognize adequate reasons for not giving
in to the threat. On the other hand, one can see such reasons only if
there were such reasons; and there were such reasons only if a person
who recognized and weighed all the reasons appropriately would not
have capitulated. So, "reasonable" in duress doctrine should be
interpreted as meaning "has the capacity to recognize what reasons
he has for resisting the threat and to give them appropriate weight in
his deliberation." But the reason we care whether such a person
would have complied with the threat is this: If he would not have
capitulated, then we cannot hope that the defendant will hold himself
accountable for failure. He is therefore an inappropriate target of the
act of second-personal address that the court, in weighing his guilt, is
deciding whether to make.
If this is right, it follows that the requirement of reasonable
firmness is justified, while the requirement of reasonable fear is not.
The reason is that the requirement of reasonable firmness is needed
in order to determine if a particular defendant is really responsible.
As an addressee of an act of second-personal address of a second-
personal reason on the part of the court, the defendant must have
certain capacities for that act to be successful. If he cannot recognize
that the threat he responded to did not, in fact, undermine his
responsibility, then he lacks one of the needed capacities. The
reasonable person question posed by the requirement of reasonable
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firmness helps us to determine if the defendant has the needed
capacity.
On the other hand, the complainant in a rape trial is not the
addressee of any act of second-personal address on the part of the
court. As is so often said, she is not on trial. But the requirement of
reasonable fear, parallel as it is to the requirement of reasonable
firmness, only has a legitimate place if the person complying with
the threat is the one whose responsibility is being assessed. It
therefore follows that the requirement of reasonable fear is
unjustified.
This last point can be put another way by looking at the MPC's
definition of "criminal coercion"--the crime of inducing another
person to act in a certain objectionable way by threatening her with
serious harm if she does not.38 It is a striking fact that there is no
appearance of the reasonable person in the elements of criminal
coercion. In particular, the jury does not need to determine if the
threats that the defendant issued would have induced a reasonable
person to comply. This is perfectly justified, however, under the
view of reasonableness being explored here. We need to know if a
reasonable person would have complied with the threat. The jury is
not concerned with whether the threatener acted wrongly, but
whether the threatened has. If a reasonable person would have
complied, then that suggests that the threatened cannot be expected
to see herself as rightly censured for her failure. She is therefore an
inapt addressee of an act of second-personal address of a second-
personal reason. But in the crime of criminal coercion, the recipient
of the threat-the victim-is not to be the addressee of the court's
act of second-personal address. The reasonableness of compliance
with the threat is therefore not relevant. Similarly, there should be
no requirement of reasonable fear. Since the complainant in a rape
trial is no more on trial than the recipient of the threat in a criminal
coercion trial, the question of the reasonableness of her fear is of no
relevance to the proceeding.
V. CONCLUSION
My aim in this paper has been to illuminate the fruitfulness of a
particular hypothesis: Appeals to reasonableness in the law are
38. Id. § 212.5.
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justified where, and only where (1) the court is involved in
implementing or regulating some act of second-personal address of a
second-personal reason; and (2) the relevant act of second-personal
address's success, or possibility of success, depends on the answer to
a question about some party's capacity to generate, recognize or
respond to those communicated reasons. As we have seen, someone
who accepts this hypothesis can explain why the appeals to
reasonableness in the tort of negligence and in the affirmative
defense of duress are justified, and why it is unjustified to require for
rape, as courts have for many years and still do in some jurisdictions,
a woman's fear of serious injury to have been reasonable when it
formed the basis of her acquiescence to sexual contact. Of course,
there are many more places in the law where reasonableness is
invoked. But the discussion here gives some hope that their
justifiability can be assessed by consideration of their relevance or
irrelevance to some act of second-personal address of a second-
personal reason being either regulated or implemented by the court.
As discussed, Darwall believes, and not without reason, that acts
of second-personal address of second-personal reasons are funda-
mental to a wide range of ordinary human practices involving the
evaluation of conduct, character, motive and capacity. If the
argument of this paper is correct, then they also play a fundamental
role in the law, a fact which emerges through reflection on the
myriad ways in which legal assessment requires an assessment of the
thoughts, feelings and actions of the reasonable person.
